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I. INTRODUCTION 
Misery underlies Malaysia’s expanding export industry. The 
misery is underpinned by social and economic factors related to the 
working conditions created by Malaysia’s migrant labor policies. A 
lack of enforceable international labor standards allows the Malaysian 
government to depress the wages and social rights of migrant workers 
in Malaysia,1 thereby depressing the global manufacturing labor 
market by undercutting the bargaining power of manufacturing 
laborers around the world.2 
Independent reports assessing the social conditions of migrant 
workers in Malaysia show that Malaysian government officials are 
implicated in incidents of harassing legal migrant workers; in one such 
incident, industry health inspectors discovered that a sick factory 
worker suffered from an infection and rather than provide treatment, 
the inspectors reported the worker to government officials who arrested 
her, imprisoned her, and threatened her with deportation while her 
condition grew worse.3 Many layers of Malaysian government—health 
workers, police, magistrates, and prison officials—were involved in the 
abuse of this particular migrant laborer.4 Furthermore, the conditions 
that migrant laborers live in can be fatal—the Nepal embassy in 
Malaysia notes that since 2005, an average of twenty-five Nepalese 
workers in Malaysia dies every month because of “squalid living and 
working conditions, stress, work pressure, and family pressure and lack 
of rest.”5 
 
1.  See infra Part IV. 
2. See infra Part III. 
3. WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, ASSESSMENT PROLEXUS BHD. (HONSIN APPAREL) 
MALAYSIA FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STATUS 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.workersrights-test.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/WRC-Assessment-re-
Prolexus-Bhd-Malaysia-4.23.2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXD2-EAYT]. 
4. Id. 
5. Workers live in unhygienic and dangerous conditions with ten people sleeping in a 
single room in shifts. Ariel Ramchandani, Forced Labor Is the Backbone of the World’s 
Electronics Industry, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2018/06/malaysia-forced-labor-electronics/563873/ [https://perma.cc/L8US-M3KJ]. In 
2016, the Nepal embassy noted that over 300 Nepali workers (it is not clear which industry these 
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The impact of the poor social conditions experienced by 
Malaysian migrant workers is not confined to Malaysia and there are 
spillover effects that are felt in the United States.6 While the economic 
hardship of manufacturing workers in the United States is often 
attributed to robots and automation, the growth of Malaysian low-wage 
manufacturing in the 1990s precipitated the decline of American 
manufacturing in the 2000s.7 Research shows that the automation of 
manufacturing plays a smaller part in the decline of US manufacturing 
jobs than is popularly believed and that many US manufacturing jobs 
have not gone to robots but rather to assembly-intensive manufacturing 
jobs in countries,8 like Malaysia, where forced labor artificially deflates 
the wage burden on employers and undercuts the competitiveness of 
US labor.9 To put the scale of harm caused to American workers in 
perspective—the estimated six million manufacturing jobs that were 
lost by the United States to low-wage countries between 2000 and 2010 
is larger than the number of jobs lost in the United States during the 
Great Depression.10 
The various systems in place that regulate labor at an international 
level11 provide no defense against the damaging spillover effects of the 
Malaysian government’s policies that exploit migrant labor while 
diminishing the wages of migrants in Malaysia and manufacturing 
 
workers came from) had died in Malaysia (the Government of Nepal now bans seeking jobs 
there). Aishwardeep Kaur, Guess How Much Migrant Workers Pay to Enter Malaysia, CILISOS 
(May 8, 2018), https://cilisos.my/5-ways-we-can-improve-the-working-conditions-of-migrants-
in-malaysia/ [https://perma.cc/R9UV-TM64]. The average number of deaths is around 300 per 
year since 2005 with the majority of deaths being attributable to cardiac arrest. Report: 386 
Nepalese Migrant Workers Died Here in 2016, FREE MALAYSIA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2017/01/21/report-386-nepalese-migrant-
workers-died-here-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/T5VU-G6YK]. 
6. See infra Section II.A.3. 
7. Susan Houseman et al., Offshoring Bias in U.S. Manufacturing, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 111, 
112-14 (2011), available at https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.2.111 [https://perma.cc/ZF9L-
KH5L]. 
8. Susan N. Houseman, Understanding the Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment, 
25 UPJOHN INST. EMP. RES. (2018), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.2.111 
[https://perma.cc/5BEA-C7H7]. 
9. See Gwynn Guildford, The epic mistake about manufacturing that’s cost Americans 
millions of jobs, QUARTZ (May 3, 2018), https://qz.com/1269172/the-epic-mistake-about-
manufacturing-thats-cost-americans-millions-of-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/9BY6-MRHC]. 
10. Robert D. Atkinson et al., INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., WORSE THAN THE 
GREAT DEPRESSION: WHAT EXPERTS ARE MISSING ABOUT AMERICAN MANUFACTURING’S 
DECLINE 4 (2012). 
11. See infra Part IV.  
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laborers around the world.12 Evidence of the growing frustration with 
the lack of effective international labor regulation can be seen in the 
Trump administration’s executive order in 2017, demanding an 
investigation into the relationship between trade with certain trading 
partners and “employment and wage growth in the United States.”13 
The nexus of domestic labor conditions, international labor conditions, 
and free trade is likely to inform much of the debate over the 2020 US 
Presidential election on international relations and the economy14 and 
this Note contributes to that debate with the contention that: 
a) Malaysia, a major trade partner of the United States, is 
illegally providing regulatory subsidies15 to its export industry 
with pro-business policies that strip away the rights of migrant 
workers to attract foreign companies with a “continuous . . . 
stream of labor” and “harmonious industrial relations[.]”16 
b) The negative economic impact of Malaysia’s migrant labor 
policy on US manufacturing laborers17 makes Malaysian exports 
into the US subject to sanction under Title Nineteen, Section 1671 
 
12. See Houseman et al., supra note 8. 
13. Exec. Order No. 13,786, 82 Fed. Reg. 18110 (2017) (“Topics on Which Commerce 
and USTR Seek Information to assist Commerce and USTR in preparing the Report, 
commenters should submit information related to one or more of the assessments called for in 
the Executive Order: For each identified trading partner with which the United States had a 
significant trade deficit in goods in 2016, the Report shall: (a) Assess the major causes of the 
trade deficit including, as applicable, differential tariffs, non-tariff barriers, injurious dumping, 
injurious government subsidization, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, 
denial of worker rights and labor standards, and any other form of discrimination against the 
commerce of the United States or other factors contributing to the deficit; (b) assess whether the 
trading partner is, directly or indirectly, imposing unequal burdens on, or unfairly discriminating 
in fact against, the commerce of the United States by law, regulation, or practice and thereby 
placing the commerce of the United States at an unfair disadvantage; (c) assess the effects of the 
trade relationship on the production capacity and strength of the manufacturing and defense 
industrial bases of the United States; (d) assess the effects of the trade relationship on 
employment and wage growth in the United States; and (e) identify imports and trade practices 
that may be impairing the national security of the United States.”). 
14. See Tara Golshan & Dylan Scott, Democrats Are on the Brink of Completely 
Reorienting Their Party on Trade, VOX (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/2/18/18215442/2020-democratic-presidential-candidates-policies-trade 
[https://perma.cc/Y7KU-QWVN]. 
15. See infra Section II.A. 
16. See infra note 20; Nicola Piper, Marie Segrave & R. Napier-Moore, What’s in a 
Name? Distinguishing forced labour, trafficking and slavery, 2015(5) ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV. 
1, 1 (2015), http://www.antitraffickingreview.org/index.php/atrjournal/article/view/133/133 
[https://perma.cc/24C2-FMBQ]. 
17. See infra Section II.A.  
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of the United States Code—the countervailing duty (“CVD”) 
statute.18 
This Note proceed as follows. Part II gives a brief overview of the 
CVD statute, describes the process by which the CVD statute is applied 
to imports deemed to have benefited from a trade subsidy, and frames 
the problem of Malaysia’s migrant labor policy as an issue that could 
be addressed by countervailing duty law. Part III assesses whether 
countervailing duty law is a viable solution to the problem by analyzing 
the recognized application of the CVD statute to subsidies. Part IV 
addresses potential policy concerns implicated in using trade law to 
bridge gaps created by a lack of international labor market regulation. 
Part V concludes that even though the use of trade law is an imperfect 
solution, the ends of providing a needed disincentive to worker 
exploitation justifies the means because of the lack of other viable 
alternatives. 
II. THE NEXUS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DOMESTIC 
LABOR 
The high volume of migrant workers in Malaysia, coupled with 
the prevalence of forced labor,19 means that many laborers in Malaysia 
are not able to bargain for wages; accordingly, workers in the United 
States suffer because Malaysia is a major producer of goods for export 
and Malaysian migrant labor policy places downward pressure on the 
wages of American workers in the manufacturing sector. If a 
manufacturer is interested in moving a part of its production facilities 
to Malaysia, it is likely to encounter the Malaysian Investments and 
Development Authority (“MIDA”). MIDA advertises Malaysia as 
“heaven for foreign companies” and offers export manufacturers a 
package of pro-business policies that promise to provide a 
“continuous . . . stream of labor” together with “harmonious industrial 
 
18. What are Anti-Dumping (AD) & Countervailing Duties (CVD)?, U.S. CUSTOMS & 
BORDER PROT. (July 24, 2018), https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/216/~/anti-
dumping-%28ad%29-and-countervailing-duties-%28cvd%29 [https://perma.cc/5RVS-DLFU]. 
19. Experts in the area of forced labor and human trafficking will urge caution in 
conflating the two concepts because although there is a close relationship between debt bondage, 
forced labor, and human trafficking—the concepts in this area are terms of art that need to be 
understood independently. See Piper, Segrave & Napier-Moore, supra note 16, at 1–9. For the 
purposes of this Note, a clear line is not always drawn between debt bonded labor, trafficked 
labor, and forced labor in the Malaysian export industry. 
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relations.”20 While the advertised benefits to manufacturers of 
profitability and harmonious production are no doubt tantalizing, the 
unfortunate reality behind MIDA’s offer is that it is underwritten by 
forced labor and human trafficking.21 The Government of Malaysia has 
constructed the benefits that MIDA offers to manufacturers—
characterized, below, as regulatory subsidies22—by creating a system 
that keeps the costs of migrant labor artificially low while forcing labor 
markets in other countries to compete with depressed labor costs.23 The 
following sections provide support for the central argument that the 
Government of Malaysia’s migrant labor policies are a form subsidy to 
Malaysian export manufacturers that the United States can sanction 
with the CVD statute.24 
A. “Regulatory Subsidy,” “Social Dumping,” and “Trade 
Injury” 
The CVD statute enables the United States Department of 
Commerce (“Commerce“), in response to a petition from a domestic 
plaintiff that alleges harm as a result of imported goods, to neutralize 
government subsidies that harm US domestic industry through the 
application of a tariff calculated to offset the subsidy.25 The CVD 
 
20. Why Malaysia, MALAYSIAN INV. DEV. AUTH., http://www.mida.gov.my/home/why-
malaysia/posts/ [https://perma.cc/88HT-T7TU]. 
21. See 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report, infra note 109.  
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See infra Sections II.C.2 and II.C.3. 
24. Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and 
Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 47, 92 (1993). 
25.  If the [Department of Commerce] determines that the government of a country 
or any public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, 
a countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a 
class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, 
into the United States, and 
(2) in the case of merchandise imported from a Subsidies Agreement country, the 
Commission determines that— 
(A) an industry in the United States—(i) is materially injured, or (ii) is threatened 
with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by 
reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) 
of that merchandise for importation, then there shall be imposed upon such 
merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to 
the amount of the net countervailable subsidy. 
19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2012). 
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statute gives Commerce the authority to unilaterally impose a CVD26 
on goods from countries that, after a period of investigation, are 
deemed to have benefited from an impermissible government subsidy 
that materially injures a US industry.27 Investigation proceedings into 
subsidies are triggered either by an interested party within the United 
States filing a petition,28 or on motion by the Secretary of Commerce 
without a petition.29 An interested party may be, among other things, a 
domestic manufacturer, a union, or a trade association representing an 
industry.30 
Before describing CVD law in more detail, Section II.A provides 
necessary context by defining key terms, “regulatory subsidy,” “social 
dumping,” and “trade injury,” and their relationships to one another in 
the context of applying the CVD statute to Malaysian manufactured 
electronics imported into the United States. International trade law 
 
26.  “The term ‘countervailing duty’ shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for 
the purpose of off-setting any bounty or subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the 
manufacture, production or export of any merchandise[.]” Agreement on Interpretation & 
Application of Articles VI, XVI & XXIII of the Agreement of Oct. 30, 1947, at n.4, As Rectified 
by the Proces-verbal of Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 (1980), 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/tokyoround/subsidiescode.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX22-U56N]. 
27. If the Department of Commerce] determines that the government of a country or 
any public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, 
a countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a 
class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, 
into the United States . . . 
(A) an industry in the United States— 
(i) is materially injured, or 
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or 
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, 
by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of 
sales) of that merchandise for importation, then there shall be imposed upon such 
merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to 
the amount of the net countervailable subsidy. 
19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2012). 
28.  “(a) Initiation by administering authority. A countervailing duty investigation 
shall be initiated whenever the administering authority determines, from information 
available to it, that a formal investigation is warranted into the question of whether 
the elements necessary for the imposition of a duty under section 19 USC. § 1671(a) 
exist. (b) Initiation by petition.”  
19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2016); see also United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 
1983). 
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2016). 
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (4), (9) (2016). 
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prohibits subsidies designed to promote exports31 because free market 
principles deem subsidies as damaging to the efficient function of 
markets.32 The term “regulatory subsidy” must be understood in 
contrast to the subsidies trade law ordinarily involves. The term 
“subsidy” generally refers to a government policy that lowers the costs 
of production to a given industry by directly providing economic 
support in the form of land, monetary support, materials, goods, or 
services at a reduced rate;33 whereas a “regulatory subsidy” refers to a 
government policy that reduces the production cost to an industry by 
lowering certain transaction costs, such as the cost of waste disposal by 
allowing toxic dumping or the costs of transacting with third parties by 
deregulating labor law.34 
“Social dumping” refers to the policies of exporting countries that   
artificially lower production costs by depressing labor rights35 to export 
goods into importing countries that cannot compete with the exporter’s 
low wage costs.36 Free market principles allow exporters with naturally 
occurring comparative wage advantages, such as lower labor costs due 
to a low cost of living, to exploit such advantages.37 Governments that 
deregulate labor markets to stimulate their export industries with cost 
relief subsidies, however, may be subject to penalties if the act of 
deregulation causes a trade injury to the importing country’s domestic 
industry.38 
The plain language of the CVD statute grants a plaintiff in the 
United States a cause of action against an exporting country when the 
 
31. Timothy Meyer, Free Trade, Fair Trade, and Selective Enforcement, 118 COLUM. L. 
REV. 491, 511–12 (2018). 
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 806 (AM. LAW INST. 
1987). International trade law prohibits subsidies designed to promote exports because free 
market principles view subsidies as damaging to the efficient function of markets. Richard B. 
Freeman, International Labor Standards and World Trade: Friends or Foes?, in THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AHEAD 87 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1996). 
33. Subsidy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
34. Id. 
35. Elissa Alben, Note, GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the Labor-
Trade Link, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1423 (2001); See generally Marc H. Klein, The Single 
European Act and Social Dumping: A New Appeal for Multinational Collective Bargaining, 12 
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 411 (1991). 
36. Alben, supra note 35, at 1417. 
37. See Lance Compa, International Labor Standards and Instruments of Recourse for 
Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 151, 152 n.4 (1992). 
38. See Diane P. Wood, “Unfair” Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1167-68 (1989). 
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country’s government gives a “financial contribution”39 to an export 
industry that provides an economic “benefit;”40 where the subsidy is 
“specific”41 to exports; and where the subsidy causes, or threatens to 
cause, a material injury to US domestic industry.42 For Commerce to 
impose a duty on goods imported into the US there must be evidence 
of— 
i. an economic contribution to industry 
ii. that confers a benefit 
iii. which is specific to the export industry (i.e., not generally 
available), and 
iv. causes a material injury to a party in the United States.43 
In the context of trade, “trade injuries” occur when a manufacturer 
in the importing country is unable to compete with the cost of 
production of imported goods without receiving a subsidy.44 CVD law 
provides a cause of action to those who have suffered a trade injury as 
a result of imported products that receive subsidies.45 Section II.B. 
describes how the CVD statute operates. 
 
39.  A financial contribution may involve direct funding by a government or public 
entity to a producer, or the indirect transfer of funds through a funding mechanism or 
a private party. It includes: 
(i) A direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, equity infusions) or the potential 
direct transfer of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan guarantees); 
(ii) Foregoing or not collecting revenue that is otherwise due (e.g., tax credits, 
deductions from taxable income, import duties); 
(iii) Providing goods or services for less than adequate remuneration, other than 
general infrastructure; 
(iv) Purchasing goods for more than adequate remuneration.  
Enforcement and Compliance-Subsidy Allegation, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/petitioncounseling/pcp-subsidy-allegation.html 
[https://perma.cc/HA4L-9562]. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. A World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Global Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(“GATT”) panel has confirmed that government taxation relief that targets export industries 
constitutes an actionable subsidy. See John Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: 
The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 (1978); infra note 138. Countervailable 
subsidies include programs that “forego . . . revenue that is otherwise due, such as granting tax 
credits or deductions from taxable income[.]”. Id. 
43. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1930). 
44. See Jackson, supra note 38. 
45. All parties to the WTO GATT agreement have their own CVD law. See infra notes 
135, 144, 146, 147, 151. 
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B. How the CVD Statute Operates 
Under the CVD statute, Congress has granted US industry 
representative or manufacturers, among others, standing to file a 
petition with Commerce and the International Trade Commission 
(“ITC”).46 A petition by a domestic plaintiff in the United States against 
Malaysian exports must make a plea for relief against economic factors, 
such as depressed wages.47 Here, the US domestic plaintiff would 
allege that the Government of Malaysia’s deregulation of migrant labor 
subsidizes Malaysian manufactuters by fostering a system that 
depresses wages and artificially lowers the costs of production. Once a 
plaintiff simultaneously files a petition that satisfies the requirements 
in sections 351.202 through 20348 and alleges, for example, that 
imported goods have received a subsidy prohibited by the SCM 
Agreement, the CVD action is commenced.49 After commencing a 
CVD investigation, Commerce and the ITC begin their parallel 
preliminary determinations and publish the results of the investigations 
in the Federal Register50—”[a] daily publication of . . . federal-agency 
regulations of general applicability and legal effect[.]”51 
The ITC makes the preliminary determinations as to whether the 
imported goods under review have caused or threaten to cause material 
injury to US industry52 and Commerce makes a preliminary 
determination53 as to whether the alleged subsidies received by the 
imported goods listed in the plaintiff’s petition are export specific 
subsidies.54 “Material injury” or threat of material injury includes, for 
example, depressed prices and is defined by Title Nineteen, Section 
 
46. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a), there must be a determination of industry support: 
“(4)(A) . . . the administering authority shall determine that the petition has been filed by or on 
behalf of the industry, if—(i)the domestic producers or workers who support the petition account 
for at least 25 percent of the total production of the domestic like product . . . .” 
47. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7). 
48. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.202-03 (2013) (CVD petition requirements). 
49. 19 C.F.R. §§ 206.2, 207.10 (2015). 
50. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.205. 
51. Federal Register, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
52. The USITC has limited discretion in terms of declining to investigate or rejecting 
petitions from domestic industries that sufficiently allege material injury. Republic Steel Corp. 
v. United States, 4 Ct. Int’l Trade 33 (1982). 
53. See id. (stating the procedure for a preliminary determination); see also 19 C.F.R. § 
351.205. 
54. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 33 Ct. Int’l Trade 1935 (2009), remanded 34 Ct. 
Int’l Trade 1193 (2010), aff’d 425 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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1677(7) of the United States Code.55 The material injury element 
provides domestic industry in the United States with a cause of action 
and standing to file a petition56 and the CVD petition is treated similarly 
to a plaintiff’s initial pleading in a civil action.57 
The ITC’s preliminary determination of a material injury inquiry 
requires a finding of a “reasonable indication of material injury or 
threat of material injury.”58 The preliminary determination requires a 
lower level of analysis than the standard applied in a final 
 
55. (7) Material injury. (A) In general. The term ‘material injury’ means harm which 
is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant . . . In making determinations 
under sections . . . [19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(a), 1671d(b), 1673b(a), 1673d(b)], the 
Commission, in each case— 
(i) shall consider— . . . 
(II) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for 
domestic like products, and 
(III) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of domestic 
like products, but only in the context of production operations within the United 
States; and 
(ii) may consider such other economic factors as are relevant to the determination 
regarding whether there is material injury by reason of imports . . . 
(F) Threat of material injury. 
(i) In general. In determining whether an industry in the United States is threatened 
with material injury by reason of imports (or sales for importation) of the subject 
merchandise, the Commission shall consider, among other relevant economic 
factors— . . . 
(IV) whether imports of the subject merchandise are entering at prices that are likely 
to have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and are 
likely to increase demand for further imports . . .  
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7).  
56. See ANDREAS LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 372-74 
(2d ed. 1983); see also Peter Ehrenhaft, What the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act [Can] [Will] [Should] Mean for US Trade Policy, 11 
L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1361 (1979); CURRENT ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, App. 
C (Patrick F. J. Macrory & Peter O. Suchman eds., 1982); Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. 
Holmer, The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: Principal Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Provisions, 19 INT’L L. 639 (1985). 
57. Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int’l Trade 33, 40 (1982) (“Even a rough 
analogy is sufficient to indicate that petitions should not be dismissed except for notable 
deficiencies.”). See H.R. Rep. No. 96-317 (1979); see also S. Rep. No. 96-249 (1979), as 
reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381. 
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a); see Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 8 Ct. Int’l Trade 29, 
31 (1984) (“the criterion for finding a reasonable indication of material injury should have been 
simply whether all subsidized or allegedly subsidized products of the same type could exert a 
combined effect on the domestic industry”). 
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determination.59 In addition to the requirement of “material injury,” a 
CVD will be applied only if, upon final determination, the value of the 
offending subsidy is found to exceed one percent of the total value of 
the goods.60 
The “specificity” analysis for subsidies that are generally 
available requires Commerce to use the best information obtainable to 
engage in a sequential analysis to determine whether the subsidy is de 
facto specific despite its seeming general availability.61 De facto 
specificity, as defined by Section 771(5A)(D)(iii) of the Tariff Act,62 is 
found if Commerce identifies any one of the following factors: “(I) the 
actual recipients of the subsidy, whether considered on an enterprise or 
industry basis, are limited in number; (II) an enterprise or industry is a 
predominant user of the subsidy; (III) an enterprise or industry receives 
a disproportionately large amount of the subsidy.”63 Commerce may 
conclude its analysis in the affirmative, without proceeding further in 
the analysis, when any one of the above factors, analyzed sequentially, 
is found.64 If Commerce makes a preliminary determination that 
Malaysia’s deregulation of the migrant labor market is a de facto export 
subsidy, then the ITC will make their determination as to whether the 
subsidy is, or threatens to be, a material domestic injury because of the 
subsidized imports.65  Section II.C. shows that Malaysian labor policy 
satisfies the second factor in Commerce “specificity” analysis because 
Malaysian exporters are the predominant employers of migrant labor 
and therefore the “predominant user of the subsidy[.]”66 
 
59. See Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States, 9 Ct. Int’l Trade. 403, 405 (1985) (finding 
that USITC made an error in its preliminary determination which had the effect of turning a 
preliminary determination into a final determination). 
60. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 29 Ct. Int’l Trade 276 (2005) (affirming 
that Department of Commerce can make affirmative determination in original countervailing 
duty investigation, and issue countervailing duty order, only if aggregate net countervailable 
subsidy equals or exceeds one percent ad valorem). 
61. 19 C.F.R. § 351.502 (2019). 
62. INT’L TRADE ADMIN., IMPORT ADMIN. POL’Y BULL. NO. 10.1, Specificity of Subsidies 
Provided to State-owned Enterprises (2010), https://enforcement.trade.gov/policy/PB-10.1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/22ZP-H8PA]. 
63. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii) (2016). 
64. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (the standard for determining whether a bounty or 
grant under 19 U.S.C. § 1303 or subsidy under 19 U.S.C. § 1677 has been conferred focuses on 
the effect of benefits provided to recipients rather than on nominal availability of benefits); 
Cabot Corp. v. United States, 9 Ct. Int’l Trade 489 (1985). 
65. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (2016). 
66. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii) (2016). 
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C. Social Dumping Policies Satisfy the Plain Language of the 
CVD Statute 
Malaysian exporters are the predominant employers of migrant 
labor. While the CVD statute usually addresses subsidies in their 
ordinary sense,67 it is an open question whether the CVD statute applies 
to Malaysian labor policies. To support the argument that the CVD 
statute applies to Malaysian migrant labor policy, Sub-Parts 1 and 2. 
show how Malaysia’s labor policy satisfies elements i, ii, and iii of a 
CVD petition, and Sub-Part 3 demonstrates that Malaysian labor policy 
satisfies element iv by causing an economic harm to manufacturing 
laborers in the United States. 
1. The Economic Benefit of Malaysian Labor Policy to its 
Export Industry 
Malaysian labor policy is a regulatory subsidy that provides an 
economic benefit to its export manufacturing industry by deregulating 
migrant labor policies to allow for an increased supply of migrant labor 
as well as shifting cost burdens away from the manufacturers and onto 
the migrant workers.68 The economic growth related to the Malaysian 
electronics industry69 is linked to a regulatory environment that 
diminishes the welfare of workers in Malaysia70 and abroad.71 With a 
gross domestic product (“GDP”) of US$314 billion in 201772 and the 
 
67. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1671a (2016). 
68. Supra Section II.C. 
69. The electronics industry, which is primarily export based, made up 36.7% of 
Malaysia’s total export value in 2017. Electrical and Electronics, MALAYSIAN INT’L DEV. 
AUTH., http://www.mida.gov.my/home/electrical-and-electronic/posts/ [ https://perma.cc/
E4WE-BSWF].  
70.  Malaysia – Peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak, Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 
2018, on its 107th Session, INT’L LABOR ORG. (2018), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=1000:13101:0::NO:13101:P13101_COMMENT_ID:3330953:YES [https://perma.cc/
PB3G-3SLV]; see also Ragayah Haji Mat Zin, Malaysia: Towards a Social Protection System 
in an Advanced Equitable Society, 29 ASEAN ECON. BULL. 197 (2012).  
71. See generally INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, INTERNATIONALLY 
RECOGNISED CORE LABOUR STANDARDS IN MALAYSIA: REPORT FOR THE WTO GENERAL 
COUNCIL REVIEW (2010); AMNESTY INT’L, TRAPPED: THE EXPLOITATION OF MIGRANT 
WORKERS IN MALAYSIA (2010); SARAH BORMANN ET AL., MIGRATION IN A DIGITAL AGE: 
MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE MALAYSIAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY: A CASE STUDY ON JABIL 
CIRCUIT AND FLEXTRONICS (2010), http://electronicswatch.org/migration-in-a-digital-
age_3542.pdf [https://perma.cc/43EK-5JCF]. 
72. Malaysia GDP, 2017, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=MY [https://perma.cc/9HSQ-2NJD]. 
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total volume of exports at US$217 billion in the same year,73 the export 
industry makes up almost two-thirds of Malaysia’s GDP.74 Malaysia’s 
current status as an export manufacturing economy grew out of a series 
of policies started in the 1990s that focused on Malaysia achieving 
“developed nation” status by the year 2020.75 The Government of 
Malaysia enacted economic transformation policies through a 
succession of five-year plans that targeted the global export market to 
make manufacturing more dominant than agriculture.76 Labor 
shortages presented a challenge to Malaysia’s sixth five-year economic 
development plan spanning from 1991 to 1996, which emphasized 
macroeconomic growth through policies focusing on industrialization, 
manufacturing, and trade.77 
Malaysia’s export industry, which has strong representation from 
electronics and electrical (“E&E”) manufacturers,78 started lobbying 
the Government of Malaysia to loosen the restrictions on migrant labor 
in the 1980s.79 In the early 1990s, the Malaysian government responded 
 
73. Export of Goods from Malaysia 2017: STATISTA,  https://www.statista.com/statistics/
319008/export-of-goods-to-malaysia/ [https://perma.cc/PF2P-Y8GY]. 
74. Id. Malaysia’s 2017 GDP was US$314 billion. Malaysia’s 2017 revenue from exports 
was US$217 billion. Id. 
75. Malaysian Economic Growth and Foreign Workers, 3 MIGRATION NEWS (Sept. 
1996), https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1039 [https://perma.cc/WEE5-X5UP]. 
76. See Cassey Lee & Lee Chew-Ging, The Evolution of Development Planning in 
Malaysia, 34 J. SE. ASIAN ECON. 438, 438-40 (2017). 
77. See id.; see also Vijayakumari Kanapathy, Controlling Irregular Migration: The 
Malaysian Experience (ILO Asian Reg’l Programme on Governance of Labour Migration, 
Working Paper No. 14, 2008), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-asia/—-ro-
bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_160587.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GZ9-QP8Z]; Amarjit 
Kaur, Managing Labour Migration in Malaysia: Guest Worker Programs and the 
Regularisation of Irregular Labour Migrants as a Policy Instrument, 38 ASIAN STUD. REV. 345 
(2014). 
78. Electrical and Electronics Industry in Malaysia, FACTS & DETAILS, 
http://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Malaysia/sub5_4e/entry-3697.html [https://perma.cc/
ZN8Q-3U2N].  
Malaysia is a major electronics producer and exporter. The electrical & electronics 
(E&E) industry is the leading sector in Malaysia’s manufacturing sector, contributing 
significantly to the country’s manufacturing output (26.94 percent), exports (48.7 
percent) and employment (32.5 percent). In 2010, the gross output of the industry 
totaled [US]$50.94 billion, exports amounted to [US]$75.7 billion and created 
employment opportunities for 325,696 people. The major export destinations are 
USA, China and Singapore while the major import destinations are Taiwan, USA and 
South Korea. 
Id. 
79. Mohamed Ariff, The Malaysian Economic Experience and its Relevance for the OIC 
Member Countries, 6 ISLAMIC ECON. STUD. 1, 11 (Nov. 1998); (“[In Malaysia, in the mid-
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to the influence of the manufacturing industry and changed its migrant 
worker policy.80 The changes in policy preceded consistent economic 
gains spurred by a boost in international trade.81 
Malaysia is a historically agricultural country with fewer than 
nine million domestic laborers, and the government’s shift in economic 
policy to focus on labor-intensive export manufacturing required a plan 
to increase the supply of labor.82 The Government of Malaysia 
addressed the labor shortages by increasing the influx of labor with the 
guest worker program—a government-run initiative launched in 
response to demands from the Malaysian manufacturers who had 
 
1980’s] [t]ariffs were reduced primarily to make imports cheaper and foreign workers were 
brought in large numbers to keep wages low.”); Liz Gooch, Foreign Employees Limited, 
Malaysia Is Suffering Through a Labor Shortage, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/business/economy/01labor.html [https://perma.cc/VJF5-
QMJ8].  
 
Mohamed Ariff, executive director of the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, 
said the country’s dependence on foreign labor was a result of a decision to “open the 
floodgates” to migrant workers in the late 1980s . . . then in manufacturing. Mr. Ariff 
said that in the early 1990s, when wages in the manufacturing sector were rising, 
factories had considered introducing labor-saving technology but that many had 
shelved those plans when the government let them employ more foreign workers. 
 
Id. 
 
In 1995, an explicit policy on the import of migrant labour was announced when the 
manufacturing sector, which was then the main engine of (export) growth, was also 
hit by labour shortage and had to hire contract migrant workers. In the 1995/96 annual 
national budget, the state sanctioned the import of migrant workers as an interim 
solution to meet excess demand for low-skilled labour while it pursued a longer-term 
strategy to increase productivity and expand the supply of skilled labour . . . This was 
an open acknowledgment that migrant labour played a vital role in supporting the 
dynamism of key sectors in the country. Malaysia’s heavy reliance on foreign direct 
investment to drive export growth and to provide employment to local urban job-
seekers meant that it could not risk an abrupt uprooting of footloose foreign firms 
until it could build up its domestic capabilities to drive growth. And during the 
economic upturn, foreign workers played a vital role in the macro-economic 
management of the economy. 
 
Kanapathy, supra note 77, at 355, tbl. 2 
81. Zainal Aznam Yusof & Deepak Bhattasali, Economic Growth and Development in 
Malaysia: Policy Making and Leadership 27-29 (WORLD BANK COMM’N ON GROWTH & DEV., 
Working Paper No. 27, 2008), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/
489960-1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Working_Paper_27_Economic_Growth_
Development_Malaysia_Policy_Making_Leadership.pdf [https://perma.cc/27JU-AVUN]. 
82. See generally Kaur, supra note 77. 
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previously been unable to expand because of labor shortages.83 In 
1991, the government launched the Comprehensive Policy on the 
Recruitment of Migrant Labor,84 which created a “Special Task Force 
on Foreign Labour” that approved migrant visa requests from export-
oriented industries and focused on migration policies designed to 
promote Malaysia’s export economy.85 The government’s migrant 
policy favors the export industry by placing fewer eligibility 
requirements on export manufacturers that make applications for work 
visas than domestic industry.86 
In the year 2000, documented foreign labor made up twenty 
percent of Malaysia’s workforce of nine million laborers.87 Malaysia’s 
trend of positive year over year five percent economic growth since the 
economic crash in 1998 up until 2018 positively correlates with the 
growth in migrant labor work permits and the number of migrant visas 
issued by the Government of Malaysia has doubled over twenty 
years.88 Malaysia’s labor-intensive export manufacturing industry 
 
83. See generally Kaur, supra note 77. 
84. Kanapathy, supra note 77. 
85. See Kaur, supra note 77, at 354.  
 
[i]n  late 1994 the government formed a Special Task Force on Foreign Labour to 
handle/process foreign labour applications. This Task Force was intended to be a one-
stop agency and it took over the task of processing foreign labour approvals from the 
Immigration Department. . . . The Immigration Department’s role was also expanded 
to include management of foreign labour recruitment; the identification of 
“appropriate” labour-source countries; and determination of eligibility of 
sectors/firms requiring foreign workers. Four sectors – agriculture, manufacturing, 
services and construction – were considered eligible for foreign worker employment, 
based on their contribution to the export-oriented component of the Malaysian . . 
economy . . . . 
 
Kaur, supra note 77, at 354. 
86. Kaur, supra note 77, at 355 tbl.2. 
87. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS AND U.S. 
EMBASSY, KUALA LUMPUR, FLT 02-10, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS: MALAYSIA 5 (2002), 
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=key_workpl
ace [https://perma.cc/FTU2-SPK2]. 
88. See LEE HWOK-AUN & KHOR YU LENG, COUNTING MIGRANT WORKERS IN 
MALAYSIA: A NEEDLESSLY PERSISTING CONUNDRUM 1, 4 fig. 1 (2018), 
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_25@50.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P8GT-FYSA]. In the year 2000, Malaysia counted 800,000 foreign work 
permit holders and employed persons. In 2016, that number grew to 2,100,000. 
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employs the largest ratio of migrant workers.89 The Malaysian national 
ratio for domestic-to-foreign labor is five-to-one on average; while on 
Borneo Island, in Sarawak province, in towns such as Mukah, Bintulu, 
Selangau, Sibuti, and Senadin, the percentage range of foreign laborers 
is up to forty percent.90 The reliance on migrant labor is more extreme 
in export-focused regions along the trade corridor, such as the 
Kinabatangan district on Borneo Island, where foreign labor comprises 
sixty percent of the workforce.91 
2. Policies that Favor Manufacturers and that Fail to Protect 
Migrant Workers 
While the Government of Malaysia has shown a commitment to 
growing its economy,92 there is lack of commitment to protecting 
migrant workers.93 Malaysia has the worst possible ranking status for 
human trafficking violations94 with a large amount of trafficked labor 
being to the benefit of the export-focused electronics industry fueling 
 
89. Id. at 7, tbl. 1; Jacob A. Jordaan, Foreign Workers and Productivity in an Emerging 
Economy: The Case of Malaysia, 22 REV. DEV. ECON. 148, 164 (2017) (“A comparison of the 
estimated effects of foreign workers across these various sets of industries indicates that, at least 
for the Malaysian case, positive productivity effects from the use of (low skilled) foreign 
workers are particularly pronounced in export oriented modern industries, characterized by 
assembly-intensive production processes.”). 
90. Hwok-Aun & Leng, supra note 88, at 6 fig. 2. 
91. Hwok-Aun & Leng, supra note 88, at 6 fig. 2. 
92. Why Malaysia, supra note 20. 
93. Individual Case (CAS) – Discussion: 2014, Publication: 103rd ILC session – 
Malaysia, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=
1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3175038 [https://perma.cc/66RF-EJRA].  
 
The Worker member of the Philippines expressed the view that the situation of 
migrant workers [in Malaysia] had not improved . . . and required more appropriate 
and bold actions and initiatives. He indicated that Malaysia was a country of 
destination and, to a lesser extent, a source and transit country for trafficking in 
persons. The majority of trafficking victims voluntarily immigrated to Malaysia in 
search of a better life, and while many offenders were individual business people, 
large organized crime syndicates with connections to high government officials were 
also involved. 
 
Id. 
94. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 260 (2014), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
226847.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XE5-3E48]. 
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the country’s economic growth.95 The living conditions of migrant 
workers in Malaysia has drawn the attention of the United States 
Department of Labor, which identifies the root cause of the precarious 
way of life endemic to migrant workers in Malaysia as a gap between 
the Government of Malaysia’s existing laws and the Government of 
Malaysia’s lack of enforcement96 of those laws.97 
The Government of Malaysia’s migrant labor policies place 
financial burdens on vulnerable migrant communities that lead to 
migrant indebtedness and forced labor.98 One prominent example of 
the Malaysian government enacting policies that burden migrants and 
benefit manufacturers can be traced to the year 1991, when the 
government enacted an annual per-capita flat tax on migrant workers 
(“Foreign Worker Tax”).99 The Foreign Worker Tax was originally 
intended to discourage employer reliance on foreign workers by 
 
95. Ariel Ramchandani, Forced Labor Is the Backbone of the World’s Electronics 
Industry, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/
06/malaysia-forced-labor-electronics/563873/ [https://perma.cc/ML2P-VWTK]. 
96. Evelyn Shyamala Devadason & Chan Wai Meng, Policies and Laws Regulating 
Migrant Workers in Malaysia: A Critical Appraisal, 44 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 19 (2014), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/00472336.2013.826420 
[https://perma.cc/28QR-N3YJ]. 
97.  The US Department of Labor identifies Malaysia’s treatment of migrant workers as a 
problem area and has allocated US$70,000 to advocacy programs for workers’ rights between 
2015 and 2019. An Independent Multi-Project Evaluation of Protecting the Rights of Migrant 
Workers Through Empowerment and Advocacy in Malaysia and Support for Labor Law and 
Industrial Relations Reform in Malaysia (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/
protecting-rights-migrant-workers-through-empowerment-and-advocacy-malaysia 
[https://perma.cc/7QN4-PMZM]. 
98. PIYASIRI WICKRAMASEKARA, INT’L LABOUR ORG., BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND 
MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING ON MIGRATION OF LOW-SKILLED WORKERS: A REVIEW 26 
(2015), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/
documents/publication/wcms_413810.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CS7-WLGG].  
 
There is increasing attention on recruitment costs as a major cause of poor governance 
and protection gaps in labour migration (citation omitted).  High . . .  recruitment fees 
lead to high debt burdens and erode savings and remittances, and thus erode benefits 
from migration, for both origin and destination countries and migrants themselves.  
 
Id.  
See generally DIRECTOR-GENERAL, INT’L LABOUR ORG., A GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST 
FORCED LABOUR (2005), https://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc93/pdf/rep-i-
b.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VM4-9USP].  
99. ILO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, REVIEW OF LABOUR MIGRATION 
POLICY IN MALAYSIA 19 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-asia/—-ro-
bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_447687.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS8X-FARL]. 
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making the tax payable by employers.100 However, employer groups 
successfully lobbied the government to shift the burden of paying the 
Foreign Worker Tax from employers to employees.101  The tax raises 
significant revenue—close to half a billion in US dollars annually in 
2012—with no guarantee of services or benefits to the taxed migrant 
population;102 while MIDA promises foreign investors responsive 
governance and a “continuous” supply of “productive” and 
“harmonious”103 workers in return for a tax that the employers do not 
pay.104 
Despite taxing migrants, the Government of Malaysia does not 
deal with migrant laborers directly and migrants are largely managed 
by a system of agencies that charge unregulated fees for their 
services.105 The intermediaries that charge fees to migrant workers are 
linked to both human-trafficking syndicates and Malaysian 
government officials.106 The financial vulnerability of migrants is made 
worse by the burden of paying for additional employment-related 
services that can cost over Malay.RM2,000 (ringgits) per year107—
approximately two months’ salary for the lowest paid worker.108 The 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id.  
The Malaysian Government has imposed an annual levy on employment of foreign 
workers since 1992. Initially, it was payable by migrant workers but was shifted to 
employers in 2009 to encourage economic restructuring. In 2013, employers were 
granted permission to transfer the levy back to workers. The justification provided 
was that it would not represent a significant financial burden for migrants given the 
salary increase they would receive of between 30-50 per cent under the Minimum 
Wage Order. 
Id. 
102. See Ramchandani, supra note 95. 
103. See Why Malaysia, supra note 20. 
104. See Why Malaysia, supra note 20. 
105. Kaur, supra note 77, at 361. 
106. See Individual Case (CAS), supra note 93. 
107. See ILO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 99, at 21 n.6.  
The levy is just one of the eight government fees applied to employment of migrant 
workers: (1) Levy: MYR 410 - 1,850 (determined by sector); (2) Visit pass: MYR 60; 
(3) Visa: MYR 15 - 100 (determined by nationality); (4) Processing fee: MYR 125; 
(5) Security bond: MYR 250 - 1,500 (determined by nationality); (6) Foreign Worker 
Compensation Scheme: MYR 86 + 5 per cent service charge; (7) Health insurance 
premium: MYR120; and (8) Medical examination: MYR 180 – 190 (determined by 
gender). 
See ILO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 99, at 21 n.6. (citing 
2014 Malaysian Ministry of Home Affairs data). 
108. See ILO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 99, at 21 n.6. 
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regulatory environment that imposes high costs on migrants often 
results in workers being forced into debt before they even enter the 
country.109 
3. Material Injury to US Manufacturing Laborers 
Malaysian labor policy, coupled together with Malaysia’s 
dominance in export manufacturing, means that manufacturing 
laborers in the United States compete with the Malaysian labor force. 
The net result of this competition has been that many laborers in the 
US manufacturing industry have experienced stagnant wages or job 
losses.110 Malaysian export manufacturers recruit substantial numbers 
of migrants and save employment costs on hiring migrants because of 
a regulatory environment that keeps migrants in a politically, 
physically, and economically vulnerable position, thereby contributing 
to lower labor costs.111 Since 2000, the closure of more than 78,000 
manufacturing sites in the United States,112 has led to a twenty-eight 
percent decline in US manufacturing employment.113 
Malaysia’s labor policy presents a problem to the international 
labor market that the current regulatory framework does not address. 
 
109. 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report - Malaysia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 27, 
2017), http://www.refworld.org/docid/5959ec93a.html  [https://perma.cc/T6GQ-YN5L]  
 
[M]igrants are subjected to forced labor or debt bondage by their employers, 
employment agents, or informal labor recruiters when they are unable to pay the fees 
for recruitment and associated travel. Foreign workers employed by outsourcing or 
contract labor companies, which may or may not have oversight of personnel issues 
or day-to-day working conditions, have heightened vulnerabilities to exploitative 
labor conditions and a reduced ability to resolve disputes. Agents in labor source 
countries may impose onerous fees on workers before they arrive in Malaysia, in 
some cases causing debt bondage. Foreign workers in Malaysia and the companies 
that employ them are subject to a complex system of government fees for immigration 
processing, foreign worker levies, and other administrative processes. The law allows 
many of the fees, which are initially paid by employers, to be deducted from workers’ 
wages, incentivizing employers to prevent workers from ending their employment 
before fees are recouped. 
 
Id. 
110. Houseman, supra note 8, at 20. 
111. See supra Section II.C.2. 
112. Houseman, supra note 8, at 5. 
113. Guildford, supra note 9; Leo Gerard, Who is Killing American Manufacturing?, 
INDUSTRY WEEK (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.industryweek.com/who-is-killing-
manufacturing [https://perma.cc/4S82-U5FM]. 
2019] COUNTERVAILING SOCIAL DUMPING 1603 
Part II explained the link between trade law, Malaysian economic 
growth, the poor social conditions experienced by migrant laborers in 
Malaysia, and the economic hardship of manufacturing laborers in the 
United States. While Part II only hinted at the proposition that trade 
law may be a viable solution to the problems created by Malaysia’s 
migrant labor policy, Part III presents a deeper analysis of the viability 
of that solution. 
III. TRADE LAW AS A SOLUTION TO ECONOMIC 
EXPLOITATION 
Application of the CVD statute to the type of regulatory subsidies 
described in Part II would provide an economic disincentive to 
governments that seek to deregulate labor policy to achieve economic 
growth. Therefore, the CVD statute may address the problem of the 
regulatory gap in international labor regulation that allows the 
Malaysian government to exploit migrant workers by disincentivizing 
profit driven labor market deregulation.114 The proposed solution begs 
the question of whether “regulatory subsidies”115 fall within the scope 
of the CVD statute. If a CVD petition alleges a regulatory subsidy, 
Commerce would make the preliminary determination as to whether 
such a subsidy falls within the meaning of the statute. As discussed in 
Part II, there are four elements that need to be alleged in a plaintiff’s 
CVD petition for Commerce to begin its investigation and preliminary 
determinations into alleged government subsidies: i) a contribution 
from the government, ii) that confers an economic benefit to industry, 
iii) and is not generally available, but is specific to the export industry, 
and iv) causes a material injury to a party in the United States.116 While 
Part II provided an illustration of how Malaysian migrant labor policy 
arguably satisfied the elements of a CVD petition, Part III presents an 
analysis of a threshold issue: whether regulatory subsidies fall within 
the scope of the CVD statute. 
 
114.  See supra Section II.C.2. 
115. Trachtman, supra note 24, at 92. 
116. See supra note 43. 
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A. The Meaning of Subsidy 
The policies and processes for investigating subsidies are well 
defined but the meaning of the word “subsidy” is not.117 Although the 
remedy of CVD is statutory, the definition of subsidy has been subject 
to common law development.118 The remedy of CVD has existed in US 
trade law for over a century: first in 1897, in Title 19, Section 1303 of 
the United States Code, which allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to 
place duties on imported goods benefitting from any “bounty or 
grant.”119 The CVD remedy to trade injuries is also in Section 753 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, codified and incorporated into Title 19, Section 
1671 of the United States Code after the passage of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979120 and later amended by the Trade and Tariff 
Act of 1984.121 Section 1303, repealed in 1994,122 existed for some 
time alongside Section 1671, and applied only to countries not a party 
to the relevant international agreements; while Section 1671 applied, 
and continues to apply, to countries that are party to the international 
agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures (“SCM 
Agreement”).123  
Before there were legislative attempts to define actionable 
subsidies, such as the 1979 Subsidies Code Annex,124 the definition of 
 
117. William Lay, Redefining Actionable “Subsidies” Under U.S. Countervailing Duty 
Law, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1495 (1991). 
118 See Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 199 (1989); Charles J. Goetz et al., The Meaning of “Subsidy” and “Injury” in the 
Countervailing Duty Law, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 17–32 (1986). 
119. Trachtman, supra note 24, at 92. 
120. Pub. L. No. 96-39, U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE, https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-93/pdf/STATUTE-93-Pg144.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAN7-QNZ6]. 
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 806, supra note 32. 
122. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (repealed. Pub. L. No. 103–465, title II, § 261(a), Dec. 8, 1994, 108 
Stat. 4908). 
123. See Cabot Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int’l Trade 664, 671-72  (1988); see also 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, Annex 
1A, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, https://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [https://perma.cc/5925-DL8G] [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
124. Agreement on Interpretation & Application of Articles VI, XVI & XXIII of the 
Agreement of Oct. 30, 1947, As Rectified by the Procesverbal of Dec. 17, 1979., T.I.A.S. No. 
9619 (1980), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/tokyoround/subsidiescode.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9C93-HL34] [hereinafter Subsidies Code]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 806, supra note 32. 
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an actionable subsidy—or “bounty or grant”125—developed in the 
United States through the common law.126 The definition continues to 
develop through the common law, where, for example, in 1985, after 
the SCM Agreement, in Cabot Corp. v. United States,127 the Court of 
International Trade held that the term “bounty or grant” in Title 
Nineteen, Section 1303 of the United States Code has the same 
meaning as the term “subsidy” in the CVD statute.128 
1. Specific Export Subsidies 
CVD investigations deal with two types of subsidy: actionable 
subsidies and non-actionable subsidies. There are two types of 
actionable subsidy: a de jure export subsidy (such as a direct economic 
subsidy to the export industry referred to in Section II.A and de facto 
“specific” subsidies to the export industry, as described in Cabot).129 
Generally available subsidies are not countervailable because they are 
not “specific” to the export industry, as required by Title 19, Section 
1677(5A).130 In Cabot, a reviewing court affirmed Commerce’s 
determination that the “general availability” of a subsidy in theory did 
not defeat a finding of a subsidy when the subsidy was mainly used, in 
practice, by export manufacturers.131 Similarly, even though domestic 
manufacturers in Malaysia may, in theory, apply for an allocation of 
guest worker visas—the data show that Malaysia is an export economy, 
that migrant policy concentrates migrant labor in export manufacturing 
areas, and that export manufacturers are the largest beneficiaries of 
Malaysia’s guest worker program.132 Therefore, as in Cabot, a CVD 
 
125. A subsidy is the same as a “bounty or grant,” it is a benefit conferred upon “a specific 
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5). 
126. See, e.g., Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903) (holding that a “bounty” was 
given by Russia to sugar exporters in the form of a saleable certificate of freedom from excise 
taxes); see also Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919) (affirming that the 
determination that England’s allowance against excise taxes on liquor exports was a 
countervailable “bounty”). 
127. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 9 Ct. Int’l Trade 489 (1985); Trachtman, supra note 24, 
at 92. 
128. See Cabot Corp., 9 Ct. Int’l Trade, at 494-95. The holding in Cabot has been codified 
within the definitions of “countervailable subsidy.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5); Trachtman, supra 
note 24, at 92. 
129. See Trachtman, supra note 24. 
130. See Trachtman, supra note 24. 
131. See Trachtman, supra note 24. 
132. See supra Section II.C.2. 
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petition can potentially claim that if the Government of Malaysia’s 
migrant policies are subsidies, then they are export specific subsidies 
subject to a CVD order. 
A successful CVD petition results in Commerce imposing a tariff 
on a specific imported good that has received an “actionable subsidy” 
from an exporting country.133 The question of what counts as an 
actionable subsidy has no clear answer and investigations turn on direct 
and circumstantial evidence.134 The application of a CVD to an 
exporting country’s goods is subject to review by the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”),135 and such orders against non-actionable 
subsidies may be challenged and referred to the dispute settlement 
process at the WTO.136 In the United States, final determinations on 
CVD petitions by Commerce and the ITC (either to apply or to not 
apply CVD) are also subject to domestic judicial review under Title 
Nineteen, Section 1516 of the United States Code.137 
The applicable definitions of a “countervailable subsidy” to CVD 
orders issued under the CVD statute are in Title 19, Section 1677(5) 
(“CVD Definitions”).138 The CVD Definitions include government 
 
133. See Kelly Phillips Erb, As Trump Talks Tariffs, Here’s What You Need To Know, 
FORBES (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2018/03/01/as-trump-
talks-tariffs-heres-what-you-need-to-know/#200189d4195a [https://perma.cc/Y4DB-S928].  
134. See American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 8 Ct. Int’l Trade 20, 25-26 (1984) 
(quoting SCM Corp. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int’l Trade 7, 13 (1982)); 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a). 
135. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”), WORLD 
TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6J2B-HTSM]. 
136. A unique contribution, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm [https://perma.cc/CV9H-Z563]. 
137. See Mannesmann-Sumerbank Boru Endustrisi T.A.S. v. United States, 23 Ct. Int’l 
Trade 1052 (1999) (CIT reviews and remands a CVD order on welded carbon steel line pipe, 
tubes, and pipes from Turkey to the extent of Commerce’s calculation of importers’ ad valorem 
subsidy rate in determining countervailing duty rate, because it deviated from prior practice). 
138.  1677(5)—Countervailable subsidy. 
 
(A) In general. 
Except as provided in paragraph (5B), a countervailable subsidy is a subsidy 
described in this paragraph which is specific as described in paragraph (5A) 
(B) Subsidy described. A subsidy is described in this paragraph in the case in which 
an authority 
(i) provides a financial contribution . . . 
(D) Financial contribution. The term “financial contribution” means . . . 
ii) foregoing or not collecting revenue that is otherwise due, such as granting tax 
credits or deductions from taxable income, 
(iii) providing goods or services, other than general infrastructure . . . .   
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programs that act as a financial contribution or “price support”—within 
the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT 1994—to an exporting 
industry.139 Examples of financial contributions to industry in Article 
XVI that apply to the Malaysian policies described in Part II include 
government actions to exempt export-focused industries from certain 
regulatory costs, such as the Foreign Worker Tax,140 otherwise payable 
by the domestic industry.141 
The definitions of subsidies that are subject to sanction under 
CVD law within the international framework are equally open-ended. 
While the SCM Agreement allows CVDs as a remedy for subsidies, 
and the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code Agreement (“Subsidies 
Code”)142 provides guidance on the interpretation and application of 
CVD, both agreements remain deliberately vague143 as to the definition 
of the term “subsidy.”144 Neither the SCM Agreement nor the Subsidies 
Code requires countries implementing CVD remedies into their 
domestic code145 to provide statutory definitions of the term 
“subsidy.”146 The Subsidies Code does, however, provide a non-
exhaustive list147 of potential examples of subsidies within the Annex 
A or the SCM Agreement.148 Malaysia’s policy of making the Foreign 
 
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5). 
139. See generally Article XVI-Subsidies, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art16_gatt47.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6MA-
F9HG]. 
140. See supra Part II. 
141. See supra Part II. 
142. See Subsidies Code, supra note 124, at 4. 
143. See William K. Wilcox, GATT-Based Protectionism and the Definition of a Subsidy 
16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 129, 137 n.53, 163 (1998). 
144. Lay, supra note 117, at 1496. 
145. Malaysian CVD law provides that: 
43. (1) When no applicable international obligation on countervailing and anti-
dumping duties exist between Malaysia and the interested foreign government— 
(a) countervailing and anti-dumping duties may be imposed without regard to 
an investigation referred to in sections 4 and 20; and (b) the Government shall 
be entitled to use any administrative and legal definition, methodology and 
procedure it deems appropriate, with regard to the investigations.  
Laws Malaysia, Act 504, Countervailing and Antidumping Duties Act 1993, 
http://www.miti.gov.my/miti/resources/fileupload/Countervailing_and_Anti-
Dumping_Duties_Act_1993_[Act_504].pdf [https://perma.cc/2VLV-KGLJ]. 
146. Lay, supra note 117, at 1496. 
147. Wilcox, supra note 143, at 137. 
148. (a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry 
contingent upon export performance . . . 
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Worker Tax payable by employees rather than employers149 fits 
example (e) in Annex A: “(e) The full or partial exemption, remission, 
or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes150 or social 
welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial 
enterprises.” (“Annex (e)”) The Court of International Trade has 
affirmed that the definitions in the Annex fall within the scope of 
Commerce’s definition of a subsidy under Section 1677(5)(A).151 
Therefore, there is legal merit to the claim that, under the CVD Statute, 
Malaysian exports should be subject to countervailing duties designed 
to offset the benefit received from Malaysia’s migrant policy of shifting 
cost burdens from manufacturers onto migrants.152 
Part II explains the proposition that Malaysia’s migrant labor 
policy, to the extent that the policy provides a benefit to manufacturers 
in Malaysia and causes traceable harm to persons in the United States, 
is a subsidy within the meaning of the CVD Statute. Part III 
demonstrates the process that Commerce undertakes in assessing CVD 
petitions that allege such subsidies. If Commerce either accepts or 
rejects a petition alleging a regulatory subsidy, parties to the decision 
may appeal the decision, and Title Nineteen, Section 1516 of the United 
 
(e) The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, 
of direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial 
enterprises . . . 
(l) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the 
sense of Article XVI of the General Agreement.  
See Subsidies Code supra note 124, at 17-18. 
149. See supra Section II.C.3. 
150. “The term ‘direct taxes’ shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interest, rents, royalties, 
and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property.” See Subsidies Code, 
supra note 124, at 17 n.1. 
151. Can-Am Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int’l Trade 424, 430 (1987).  
 
Commerce asserts that in order to be an export bounty, grant or subsidy within the 
meaning of the countervailing duty statutes the benefit bestowed must be linked to 
the exportation of the goods. The Court finds this interpretation of section 1677(5)(A) 
“export” subsidies to be consistent with the types of subsidies described in Annex A 
to the Agreement. The Court also finds the requirements that the alleged benefit be 
contingent upon export performance or that it stimulate export sales over domestic 
sales to be consistent with the other forms of export subsidies in Annex A, and holds 
that such requirements are reasonable criteria for determining whether the benefit 
bestowed is sufficiently tied to the exportation of the goods. 
 
Id. 
152. See supra Section II.C.3. 
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States Code provides that the Court of International Trade has 
jurisdiction over such reviews of Commerce’s decisions.153 If 
Commerce rejected the application of the CVD Statute to regulatory 
subsidies, a domestic plaintiff would have a right to file an appeal of 
the rejection with the Court of International Trade.154 Similarly, if 
Commerce accepted the applicability of the CVD statute to exported 
goods from Malaysia that have benefited from Malaysia’s migrant 
labor policy, the government of Malaysia would be likely to appeal the 
decision.155 As a decision by Commerce to either accept or reject a 
petition against a regulatory subsidy may result in an appeal for judicial 
review, Part III discusses the broader implications of applying the CVD 
statute to regulatory subsidies. While Parts II and III described a gap in 
the regulation of international labor standards, Part IV explains the gap 
in more detail before Part V concludes that if trade law can bridge the 
gap, then the ends would justify the means. 
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP IN INTERNATIONAL LABOR 
REGULATION 
The CVD statute is an enforcement instrument designed to 
discourage foreign subsidies that cause injury to the markets of 
importing countries.156 Part II showed that when a government like 
Malaysia’s proves immune to exhortation and censure, international 
labor standards are jeopardized. Part II explains that CVD laws are 
often used by domestic industry in the United States against foreign 
importers perceived to be violating free trade principles.157 Part III 
addresses the necessity of using trade law remedies to discipline poor 
labor standards in Malaysia.158 
 
153. See supra note 137, and accompanying text. 
154. See supra note 137, and accompanying text. 
155. See supra note 137, and accompanying text. 
156. See Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket 
Economics in Transition Under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 993, 1009, 1009-15 (1995) (outlining the purposive theories of CVD 
laws in the context of importing countries and economic impact). 
157. There have been over 600 Antidumping and Countervailing Duty investigations 
initiated against importers into the United States since January 1, 2000. INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY 
INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED AFTER JANUARY 01, 2000 (2016), https://enforcement.trade.gov/
stats/inv-initiations-2000-current.html [https://perma.cc/92MJ-Q748]. 
158. See supra Part III. 
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The common law development of the CVD definition of 
“subsidy” described in Section III.A suggests that although 
“regulatory” subsidies have not been a part of CVD actions by 
Commerce until now, it is possible for policies that deregulate labor 
markets to fall within the scope of the CVD statute by means of judicial 
interpretation rather than through statutory amendment. The 
International Labour Organisation (“ILO”), which is instrumental in 
defining, promoting, and promulgating international labor standards, 
only has enforcement powers limited to “exhortation and censure,”159 
which means that, in the absence of enforceable international labor 
standards,160 there are few means available to prevent countries like 
Malaysia from exploiting migrant labor for economic benefit.161 
Despite a lack of global enforcement, the situation in Malaysia, where 
the government acts with impunity, is increasingly anomalous in the 
current climate of international labor regulation because—since the 
mid-1990s—free trade agreements increasingly include labor rights 
protections.162 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”), a free trade agreement to 
which Malaysia and the United States were both negotiating parties,163 
promised to address Malaysia’s international labor regulation gap by 
providing “binding and fully enforceable obligations” to protect 
workers in Malaysia and the United States from exploitation.164 In 
 
159. Compa, supra note 37, at 152. 
160. Meyer, supra note 31, at 501. 
161. Compa, supra note 37, at 152 n.4. 
162. See generally Holger Janusch, Labor Standards in U.S. Trade Politics, 49 J. WORLD 
TRADE 1047, 1060-65 (2015). 
163. See Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, Labor Standards in the TPP, in TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP: AN ASSESSMENT 261, 265–66 (Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs & Jeffrey J. Schott eds., 
2016). 
164. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/TPP-Protecting-Workers-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3QH-DYJ9]. 
 
TPP helps improve conditions on the ground in TPP countries, by using binding and 
fully enforceable obligations to: Protect the freedom to form unions and bargain 
collectively; Eliminate exploitative child labor and forced labor; Protect against 
employment discrimination; Require laws on acceptable conditions of work related 
to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health; Prevent the 
degradation of labor protections in export processing zones; Combat trade in goods 
made by forced labor in countries inside and outside TPP. 
 
Id. 
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January 2017, however, the United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”) announced the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP.165 
As a result, Malaysian labor practice remains unregulated while many 
other actors in international trade are regulated; the situation, therefore, 
presents a prisoner’s dilemma166 to parties to other agreements with 
labor standards by only providing incentives to cooperate if 
participating countries believe that the benefits of cooperation 
outweigh the costs.167 In the absence of the TPP, there is no binding 
agreement on Malaysia, and a unilateral move (such as filing a CVD 
petition against Malaysia) may be the only available means to preserve 
international labor regulation and to prevent the Government of 
Malaysia from exploiting a gap in the international regulatory 
framework to gain an unfair competitive advantage in trade.168 
The idea of using trade law to discipline poor labor standards is 
not a new one.169 In earlier articles, within the context of NAFTA, the 
possibility of using CVD as a disciplinary mechanism was raised and 
dismissed because of its association with protectionism.170 
Commentators in the 1990s concluded that applying CVD law to lax 
regulatory labor standards would likely require a change in the statute 
because Commerce would be reluctant to interpret the statute’s 
provisions in a way that linked labor and trade standards because the 
executive branch was pushing for trade liberalization and promoted the 
free market.171 In the period following the passage of NAFTA, using 
 
165. The United States Officially Withdraws from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP [https://perma.cc/7LEM-Q893]. 
166. See ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-12 (2006) (defining 
the prisoner’s dilemma as a theoretic concept that refers to bargaining situations where two 
people, acting selfishly and without cooperation, will come to a less ideal outcome than they 
would if they cooperated. A true prisoner’s dilemma means that participants are unable to 
communicate with one another when entering into agreements that dictate each other’s future 
choices and is often used as an analogy for international relations in situations where there is a 
lack of formal regulation). 
167. “[A]void the adverse consequences of a prisoner’s dilemma, in which each 
participant, unsure of whether the others will cooperate, engages in behavior that is less optimal 
than cooperative behavior.” Supra note 24, at 83. 
168. See supra Part IV. 
169. See generally Wilcox, supra note 143; Janusch, supra note 162, at 1060-65. 
170. Benjamin Rozwood & Andrew R. Walker, Side Agreements, Sidesteps, and 
Sideshows: Protecting Labor from Free Trade in North America, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333, 348 
(1993). 
171. Trachtman, supra note 24, at 92. 
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CVD to discipline poor labor standards received less frequent 
discussion, perhaps due in part to the emergence and increasing use of 
labor-provisions in bilateral and multilateral172 agreements.173 
The withdrawal of the United States from the TPP removes the 
possibility of an explicit trade labor linkage between the United States 
and Malaysia, which leaves few alternatives to parties seeking to 
discipline Malaysian unfair labor practices that harm migrants in 
Malaysia and weaken the competitiveness of United States labor.174 
However, despite its withdrawal from the TPP, the USTR’s changed 
course in trade politics may signal a willingness to use trade law175 to 
discipline foreign labor violations that undermine the US labor 
market.176 The United States executive branch recently began 
rethinking its approach to trade policy further to an Executive Order 
demanding a change to trade policy.177 Evidence of these changes can 
be seen in Commerce’s call for notice and comment in 2017, where the 
executive branch announced its intention to investigate policies that 
address the trade deficit that the United States has with significant 
trading partners.178 As part of this effort, the executive branch has 
shown a clear interest in investigating the relationship with countries 
like Malaysia and examining potential linkages between the depressed 
 
172. Axel Marx et al.., The Protection of Labour Rights in Trade Agreements: The Case 
of the EU-Colombia Agreement, 50 J. WORLD TRADE 587, 588 (2016). 
173. Janusch, supra note 162, at 1060-66. 
174. K.S. Jomo, Malaysia Urged to Withdraw Gracefully from Bad Trade Deal, THE STAR 
(Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2018/08/13/withdraw-
gracefully-from-bad-trade-deal/ [https://perma.cc/RMB2-MMS4]. 
175. Jacob M. Schlesinger, New Nafta Shows Trump’s Trade Strategy for Balancing 
Labor, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-nafta-shows-trumps-
trade-strategy-for-balancing-labor-business-interests-1538386203 [https://perma.cc/8SFK-
6WFY]. 
176. Billy Melo Araujo, Labour Provisions in EU and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: 
Rhetoric and Reality, 67 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 233 (2018). 
177. “Pursuant to Executive Order 13786 of March 31 2017, the Secretary of Commerce 
and the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in consultation with the Secretaries of State, 
the Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, and Homeland Security and the heads of any other executive 
departments or agencies with relevant expertise, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce 
and the USTR, shall prepare and submit to the President an Omnibus Report on Significant 
Trade Deficits.” Public Comments and Hearing Regarding Administration Report on Significant 
Trade Deficits, FED. REGISTER (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2017/04/17/2017-07827/public-comments-and-hearing-regarding-administration-
report-on-significant-trade-deficits [https://perma.cc/F8D6-P3VR]; Exec. Order No. 13,786, 82 
Fed. Reg. 18110 (2017).  
178. See Public Comments, supra note 177. 
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wages in the US manufacturing industry and the “denial of worker 
rights and labor standards” by trade partners with which it has large 
trade deficits.179 The US executive branch may therefore be willing to 
open an investigation against Malaysia because: 
1) the United States is one of Malaysia’s top five exporting 
destinations for electronics,180 
2) the Government of Malaysia creates unfair competitive 
advantages that American labor cannot match181 by permitting 
large-scale labor violations that artificially depress the cost of 
labor in Malaysia,182 and 
3) the United States has large trade deficits with Malaysia.183 
A. The Possibility of Judicial Review 
As noted at the end of Part III, whether Commerce accepts or 
rejects a CVD petition alleging a “regulatory subsidy,” either decision 
would be subject to judicial review by the petitioner or the 
respondent.184 When Congress drafts statutes broadly, as it has done by 
 
179. Exec. Order No. 13,786, 82 Fed. Reg. 18110 (2017). 
180. Malaysia Export Statistics, GLOBALEDGE, https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/
malaysia [https://perma.cc/K6M9-Z7PR].  
 
Malaysia is a major electronics producer and exporter. The electrical & electronics 
(E&E) industry is the leading sector in Malaysia’s manufacturing sector, contributing 
significantly to the country’s manufacturing output (26.94 percent), exports (48.7 
percent) and employment (32.5 percent). In 2010, the gross output of the industry 
totaled US$50.94 billion, exports amounted to US$75.7 billion and created 
employment opportunities for 325,696 people. The major export destinations are 
USA, China and Singapore while the major import destinations are Taiwan, USA and 
South Korea. 
 
Electrical and Electronics Industry in Malaysia, FACTS & DETAILS, 
http://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Malaysia/sub5_4e/entry-3697.html 
[https://perma.cc/U8RE-EX4L]. 
181. Houseman et al., supra note 7, at 12-14. 
182. See supra Section II.A. 
183.  USTR data show that in 2013—the latest aggregate data available—Malaysia was 
the United States’ seventeenth largest supplier of import goods, with US$27 billion in imports 
in 2013, US$14.8 billion of which came from Malaysia’s E&E sector; In E&E, the United States 
only exports US$5.4 billion worth of goods to Malaysia, creating a US$9 billion deficit of U.S. 
E&E trade with Malaysia. See Malaysia, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/malaysia 
[https://perma.cc/V3ZD-5BKJ].  
184. See supra note 137. 
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leaving the definition of ‘subsidy’ relatively open in the CVD statute, 
one cannon of interpretation from Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln 
Mills suggests that Commerce implicitly delegates power to the 
judiciary to expand the federal common law in matters like trade, which 
are of clear federal interest.185 Even though trade is a matter of federal 
interest under the Lincoln Mills cannon, a reviewing court may still be 
reluctant to interpret the CVD statute in a manner that expands the law 
to address gaps in the regulatory framework and could express 
concerns that it is up to Congress, and not the judiciary, to specifically 
address such gaps through legislation. A chief concern in broadening 
the definition of subsidy to include a government’s failure to regulate 
a certain market may be that sanctioning a government’s inaction (a 
failure to regulate domestic labor markets) could allow Commerce to 
apply CVDs to cheap goods exported from countries with governments 
that lack the capacity to regulate.186 Therefore, a reviewing court could 
 
185. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (holding that a 
broadly worded statute in an area of federal interest “authorizes federal courts to fashion a body 
of federal law”). Another example of broadly worded federal statutes deemed as open to federal 
common law expansion is the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38, which makes unlawful 
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,” which is an area where 
federal courts have developed a vast area of federal common law interpreting the statute. See 
Jay Tidmarsh, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 590 n.26 (2006). 
186.  See generally Alf Hornborg, Why You Can’t Have Free Trade and Save the Planet, 
THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 30, 2018), https://theconversation.com/why-you-cant-have-free-
trade-and-save-the-planet-94128 [https://perma.cc/PQ3G-GKWE]; Alexander Tziamalis, 
Explainer: What is Protectionism and Could it Benefit the US Economy?, THE CONVERSATION 
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-protectionism-and-could-it-
benefit-the-us-economy-73706 [https://perma.cc/H37R-BFLE]; Fred Smith, Reflections on the 
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either uphold a negative determination (finding no subsidy in 
Malaysia’s labor policy) or reverse a positive determination (a finding 
of a subsidy in Malaysia’s labor policy) by Commerce, fearing 
broadening the scope of the CVD statute would threaten to open the 
floodgates of CVD petitions against any government’s action or 
inaction that could bear the label of a regulatory subsidy. 
While the fear of opening the floodgates is understandable, such 
a fear would be unwarranted in the case of Malaysia. The approach this 
Note advocates keeps the definition of a subsidy within the legal 
framework set out under both the SCM Agreement187 and the 
definitions of subsidy under Section 1677(5)—as noted in Section 
III(A), the SCM Agreement, in Annex (e),188 makes specific mention 
of government actions that exempt industrial enterprises from taxes.189 
The labor environment in Malaysia is not the result of the government 
being unable to enact regulation, but has rather been created by specific 
programs of deregulation.190 Therefore, a reviewing court that accepted 
the theory of a subsidy suggested in this Note would not open the 
floodgates of CVD petitions because of the fact specific situation of 
Malaysia exploiting international regulatory gaps and taking purposive 
deregulatory action to shift social welfare charges away from industry 
and onto the labor force.191 Therefore, one may allay prudential 
concerns about opening the floodgates of CVD petitions by limiting the 
expanded application of a subsidy in CVD proceedings to the extent of 
the definitions in Annex A of the SCM Agreement.192 
V. CONCLUSION: DISINCENTIVIZING SOCIAL DUMPING 
Unless action is taken to disincentivize Malaysia from using 
MIDA193 to offer benefits to manufacturers that are underwritten by a 
hidden reality of forced labor, it is unlikely that the downward pressure 
on wages in the global manufacturing market will stop because 
international labor standards are not strongly enforced, and the US 
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withdrawal from the TPP means that Malaysia’s policies are otherwise 
unregulated. If CVDs supply needed legal pressure that disincentivizes 
the Malaysian Government’s policy path-dependence of relying on 
exploited migrant labor for economic gains, then the ends would justify 
the means. The international regulatory framework as applied to labor 
standards supplies few disincentives to governments who enact policies 
that discriminate against migrant labor, which undermines the global 
effort to create a baseline for labor standards. At the very least, 
characterizing the Malaysian government’s deregulation as a subsidy 
provides a chance to fill the regulatory gap and establish an economic 
incentive to uphold basic labor standards that protect vulnerable 
Malaysian migrant laborers as well as economically disempowered US 
manufacturing laborers. 
 
